While the little-known thinker Sharaf al-Dīn al-Mas'ūdī may have had doubts concerning the Ishārāt of the great Persian philosopher Avicenna, no one should have doubts concerning Ayman Shihadeh's brilliant Doubts on Avicenna: A Study and Edition of Sharaf al-Dīn al-Mas'ūdī's Commentary on the Ishārāt. Professor Shihadeh's volume is a rich study of Mas'ūdī's alMabāḥith wa-l-shukūk 'alā Kitāb al-Ishārāt, which additionally offers the first critical edition of that work. Doubts on Avicenna affords the reader a snapshot of the middle period of (...) medieval Arabic philosophy and Islamic theology (ca. eleventh to fourteenth... (shrink)

The Arab and Islamic world is in cultural, political and ethical flux. Pressures of globalisation contend with ancient ideas and concepts that permeate cultural frameworks. Health professionals are among the many groups battling to accommodate the rapidly changing conditions. In many predominantly Muslim countries intense debates are underway among clinicians about the impact of the forces of change on their practices. To help understand these forces we conducted a study of the experiences of clinicians in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, (...) a Middle Eastern nation state where the overwhelming majority of the population is Muslim. The sample contained 508 doctors and doctors-in-training, of whom 63% were male and 80% were younger than 40 years of age. It included both a quantitative survey, covering a wide range of issues, and qualitative, free-text written responses. Our results demonstrated high levels of disquiet related to the overall organisation and administration of the health care system, the specific content of ethical decisionmaking, and the impact of changing social, cultural and religious factors. Concerns included overcrowding, widespread corruption and hierarchical, non- democratic, management practices, and tensions relating to traditional and modern approaches to ethics, especially in relation to consent, organ donation, confidentiality, privacy, abortion, and the role of women. The roles of religion and religious authorities, the relative importance of the family, and community and tribal obligations were also areas of contention. The study exposes profound divisions and widely differing perspectives among Jordanian doctors and an abiding sense of uncertainty and instability within the profession. Many doctors express ambivalence in relation to both modern trends and traditional precepts. Three main axes of ethical contention were demonstrated, relating to the tensions between: "conservative" and "pragmatic" styles of decision-making; "traditional" approaches and internationalised standards of ethics; and the role of Islam and pressures to disengage ethical decision- making from religious authority. We speculate that these issues and divisions, and the deep sense of disquiet revealed by our data reflect large-scale forces to which Jordanian society is exposed and to a substantial degree may provide a way to understand the ethical predicament of many other countries in the contemporary Arab world. (shrink)

In studies of early Qurʾānic manuscripts, determining the provenance of these manuscripts is a thorny issue because in most cases they lack endowment notes or colophons. The reports in early Islamic sources regarding textual variants of regional codices may contribute to find a solution to this problem. A list of regional variants, mostly based on al-Dānī’s al-Muqniʿ, can be found in Nöldeke et al.’s The History of the Quran. However, as the authors have stated, a comparison of some of the (...) early Qurʾānic manuscripts in the Topkapı Sarayı Museum with this table of maṣāḥif al-amṣār variants indicates that the traditional reports are unreliable for identifying the provenance of Qurʾānic manuscripts because none of these codices can be attributed to any particular region. The present article is an attempt to demonstrate that this problem results from relying solely on the data provided by al-Dānī and ignoring earlier and more significant sources, such as al-Sijistānī’s Kitāb al-Maṣāḥif. It attempts to provide a new and more precise classification of regional variants by reading afresh the reports on the features of maṣāḥif al-amṣār, taking into account the sources which were not used by Nöldeke et al., especially al-Sijistānī’s Kitāb al-Maṣāḥif, thus making the list of maṣāḥif al-amṣār variants more accurate, thereby the variants of each of these early Qurʾānic Codices tally more with the reports preserved for the characteristics of one of the maṣāḥif al-amṣār in literary sources. As the texts of the surviving manuscripts are not of a diverse nature we are able, with some certainty, to draw conclusions that substantiate the reports as to the peculiarities of the muṣḥafs of different cities. (shrink)

The study aimed to investigate the impact of behavioral biases on herding for Islamic financial products with the mediation of shariah literacy. An adopted questionnaire from several published studies was used to collect data. The data were collected from 410 respondents and were analyzed with SmartPLS. The results for the direct impact showed that self-attribution, illusion of control, and information availability have a positive and significant impact on herding for Islamic financial products while shariah literacy showed an insignificant impact on (...) herding. The results for mediation showed that previously significant and positive impact turned to insignificant when shariah literacy was introduced as mediating variable between the illusion of control, self-attribution, information availability, and herding. From a theoretical perspective, this study would contribute to the existing body of knowledge of financial decision making from shariah literacy point-out. On the other hand, the findings of this study may be useful for investors to avoid herding in the Islamic financial markets. The authors synthesize the contribution made by behavioral finance studies in extending the knowledge of herding behavior in Islamic financial products with a mediating role of shariah literacy. The key limitation of the study includes data that were collected from three districts of Punjab, Pakistan. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is embedded in a wide variety of Smart City applications and infrastructures, often without the citizens being aware of the nature of their “intelligence”. AI can affect citizens’ lives concretely, and thus, there may be uncertainty, concerns, or even fears related to AI. To build acceptable futures of Smart Cities with AI-enabled functionalities, the Human-Centered AI (HCAI) approach offers a relevant framework for understanding citizen perceptions. However, only a few studies have focused on clarifying the citizen perceptions (...) of AI in the context of smart city research. To address this gap, we conducted a two-phased study. In the pre-study, we explored citizen perceptions and experiences of AI with a short survey (N = 91). Second, scenario-based interviews (N = 7) were utilized to gain in-depth insights of citizen perceptions of AI in the Smart City context. Five central themes were recognized: (1) I don’t like them monitoring me, (2) I want maximum gain for minimum effort, (3) I don’t want AI to mimic people, (4) I’ll avoid using AI if I consider the risk too high, and (5) I don’t need to be concerned about AI. These offer an idea of human-centered requirements worth considering while designing AI applications for future Smart Cities. (shrink)

In this paper we provide a psychological account of the nature and development of explanation. We propose that an explanation is an account that provides a conceptual framework for a phenomenon that leads to a feeling of understanding in the reader/hearer. The explanatory conceptual framework goes beyond the original phenomenon, integrates diverse aspects of the world, and shows how the original phenomenon follows from the framework. We propose that explanations in everyday life are judged on the criteria of empirical accuracy, (...) scope, consistency, simplicity, and plausibility. We conclude that explanations in science are evaluated by the same criteria, plus those of precision, formalisms, and fruitfulness. We discuss several types of explanation that are used in everyday life – causal/mechanical, functional, and intentional. We present evidence to show that young children produce explanations that have the same essential form as those used by adults. We also provide evidence that children use the same evaluation criteria as adults, but may not apply those additional criteria for the evaluation of explanations that are used by scientists. (shrink)

Flap EndoNuclease‐1 (FEN‐1) is a multifunctional and structure‐specific nuclease involved in nucleic acid processing pathways. It plays a critical role in maintaining human genome stability through RNA primer removal, long‐patch base excision repair and resolution of dinucleotide and trinucleotide repeat secondary structures. In addition to its flap endonuclease (FEN) and nick exonuclease (EXO) activities, a new gap endonuclease (GEN) activity has been characterized. This activity may be important in apoptotic DNA fragmentation and in resolving stalled DNA replication forks. The multiple (...) functions of FEN‐1 are regulated via several means, including formation of complexes with different protein partners, nuclear localization in response to cell cycle or DNA damage and post‐translational modifications. Its functional deficiency is predicted to cause genetic diseases, including Huntington's disease, myotonic dystrophy and cancers. This review summarizes the knowledge gained through efforts in the past decade to define its structural elements for specific activities and possible pathological consequences of altered functions of this multirole player. BioEssays 27:717–729, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Many Western historians, cultural and literary critics have viewed travel and exploration as purely western. This total exclusion of Arabo-Islamic travel has been done to demonstrate the Western sense of modernity and cultural superiority over the constructed weak “other”. However, Moroccans, Arabs and Muslims in general have been curious about the lands of the Christians and managed to break the cultural and religious barriers by reaching such lands. In this paper 1 I examine the Moroccan presence in the lands of (...) the Christians and mainly in France through analyzing the work of Ahmad Bin Qasim Al Hajari’s Nasir al-Din ala al-Qawm al Kafirin or to dwell not only at the different instances of anger and wrath but also of love and respect towards the Christians and to demonstrate the way Arab and Muslim travelers remained different from their Christian counterparts in their discursive productions. I also question Occidentalism in Ahmad Bin Qasim Al Hajari’s narrative and assert that al-Azmeh’s vision to the systems of division as essentially part of human discourse is an exaggeration. So, while Westerners get fully entangled in the process of dehumanizing the Arab and Muslim “other”, Muslims produced an ambivalent discourse that sometimes revealed their anger but not hate towards the Christians. (shrink)

The text of “The Four Premises” (Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a), which began with Sadr al-Sharī‘ah (d. 747/1346), centralizes on the actions of human beings by connecting it with the problem of good and evil in the field of kalām, Islamic philosophy and logic, and fıqh. It was also commented in with incisive and critical footness by Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 791/1390). In Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a, al-Kastalī (d. 901/1496) discusses the two main issues. One of them is good/husn-evil/qubh, the other is human (...) actions. Good-evil dichotomy here is axiological, whereas the human actions are examined within an ontological structure. The quest for the origin of moral values is a husn-qubh debate. Identifying the hierarchy of human actions in ontology is another problem. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the theological discussions in the Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a which were written following the order of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror/Fatih. This text addresses the origin of moral judgment and the question of freedom and destiny in human actions linked to the problem of good and evil. Discussing these two fundamental issues, has made it necessary to thoroughly investigate perhaps all the subheadings which concern the entire paradigm that falls under the framework of understanding the God, nature, and humanity. By looking at the treatise, the main sources of the issues being discussed are mostly generated from an Islamic jurisprudence works, entitled Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ. It can easily be discerned that the direct quotations that were made or taken indirectly were from these two sources. References to other sources were quite seldom. However, the excerpts that were taken from primary sources were interpreted and expounded by the author and amended anew. In this article al-Kastalī’s comments will be analyzed. He’s work Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a will be analyzed in depth and will be published for the first time with a critical edition. Text of Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a is a product of a culture of criticism and critical thinking has two foundations: Disproval and verification. Critical thinking is then bidirectional. It is wrong to carry out the criticism activity in only one direction. It is insufficient to simply refute the opposing idea. It is not enough to show the wrong. The so-called right idea also needs to be justified. In the Tawdīh, Sadr al-Sharī‘ah criticizes al-Ashʿarī in the issues of husn-qubh and human actions. According to this criticism, good and evil should be based on the reason. On the other hand, human is free in his actions. As it is known, goodness and badness was based on religion according to al-Ashʿarī. Acquisition (kasb) given to man was unclear. It is al-Taftāzānī who wrote an annotation on Tawḍīḥ with the name of Talwīḥ. He’s comments are successful in terms of theology. However, these interpretations do not mean that he accepted the Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a. In terms of al-Taftāzānī, proofs of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah is weak. The theological disputes in Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ have reached the level of tension in the following works. The origins of the divergence are based on the differentiation between the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. In fact, these schools are not different from each other in terms of the method they use. Although the roads walked were the same, the results achieved were different. The main reason for this is that the issue is ambiguous and the problem of good and evil is multidimensional. It is directly related to God and human. It is also connected with ontology and epistemology together. The position on the husn-qubh issue is also decisive for other theological problems. The root of the evil problem or theodicy is mostly based on this problem in Islamic thought. The actions of God and human are questioned here. The value judgments that actions will take are examined. Which action is more moral and better? Another major problem discussed in this article is human actions. It is a matter of freedom of human volition. The volition of man before the absolute God is a problem. Because God has absolute power, will and knowledge. On the other hand, God imposes responsibility on man. But what are the limits of this responsibility? Al-Kastalī discusses all these problems in the context of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah and al-Taftāzānī. In the big picture there are representatives of the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. Al-Kastalī doesn’t paint a new picture, rather makes the lines in the picture clear. In this article, the texts will be analyzed mutually. The content and uses of the concepts will be given importance. Ideas will be discussed from their main sources and the roots and different reach of the issues will be touched. The interactions of different schools of thought will also be included. (shrink)

The issue of Christ’s two natures and the Trinitarian persons of God in the Christian conception have posed a conundrum in Christian-Muslim Relations. Islam has historically held to a formulation of absolute unity while the historic Christian faith prefers to see a plurality of union as the proper expression of divine unity. The debate raged throughout the medieval period. The contemporary Egyptian intellectual Awwaḍ Simʽān is one outstanding voice in the current nexus of Muslim-Christian engagement. Simʽān presents a rationally appealing (...) formulation of the Christian doctrine, avoiding or carefully explaining some of the Christian Trinitarian terminology which Muslims regard as most egregious. He appeals to Muslim philosophers as well as historic Christian apologists to buttress his views. It is a winsome and rationally appealing formulation from an Arabic-writing theologian from within the Muslim context. This article seeks to examine the salient points of Simʽān’s formulation and ask if it could be heard in today’s Muslim milieu with all its attending dissonance due to the realities of religious militancy and social displacement. The communal unity of the Trinity may yet find corners of the Muslim world where it is welcomed and embraced. If so, Awwaḍ Simʽān’s formulation will play a visible role. (shrink)

: The thought of the Qurʾān consists of certain concepts. The concept of “fiṭrah” that expresses the physical and spiritual side of the people, is one of crucial concepts which stands for the conseption of the Qurʾān. Therefore this concept has become the one drawing attention of scholars from the earlies. Usually, the concept of “fiṭrah” is interpreted as the religion of Islam and the initial creation or the human potentiality of acception a religion and whether they can change or (...) not. In this context, it has been established a connection between the “word of khalqullah” in the Surah of Rūm and the same word in the Surah of Nisā. In this study, the essence of “fiṭrah” will be examined and the basic elements of “fiṭrah” will be focused on. Also, whether wisdom, affection, love, and ugliness are among the basic components of fiṭrah or not, will be discussed. In addition, whether there is any connection between the verse of “fiṭrah” and the words of “tabdīl” and “taġyīr” will be investigated. Summary: The Qur’ānic view of human has been set forth with certain concepts. According to our understanding, there is a strong relation between the Qurʾānic definition of human and the terms of tafsīr and ta’wīl. If the Qur’ānic view of human is put forth correctly, then the explanation and interpretation of the Qurʾān will also be more accurate. Therefore, we think that there is an important link between the characteristic of Qurʾānic view of human and the ta’wīl of naṣṣ. For this reason, we have based our study on the term, fiṭrah which explains the nature of human beings and the context of this term in the Qur’ān. In this regard we have tried to take into account in our comments the consistency through the mention of the term of fiṭrah that comes in the 30th verse of the surah al-Rūm with the relation to other verses. Main focus of the study is to see whether the essential aspects of human nature is in correlation with compassion, mental potentiality, power to produce, seeking for truth, wanting to do good and avoiding bad deeds. In the etymological dictionaries of Arabic language and in tafsir books the term of fiṭrah has been explained in various meanings such as “religion of Islam”, “unity of God”, “the first creation of human beings”, “mental capability”, “ability to accept the truth”, “initial agreement”, “pre-eternity of human destiny”, “inborn creed”, “tattoing”, “plucking females hairs” and “to geld animals”. The verse of “la tabdīla li khalqillāh” is explained that there should not be changed things and qualities which are parts of the nature of human being. The verse of "I am going to command humans and they are going to change God's creation" is associated with above mentioned fiṭrah verses. In this context neglecting to worship to Allah and taking means through other idols that are worshiped, sacrificing in the name of idols, replacing religious motives with other motives, denial of creed, making permissible acts impermissible or impermissible acts permissible, females plucking their hair, etc., have been interpreted as changing Allah’s creation. However, we do not think that the interpretation of nature that is mentioned in the verse regarding the replacement of Allah’s creation has no relation with the replacement of Allah’s creation which occurs in Surah al-Nisā. Because changing khalqullāh in al-Nisā is not to change fiṭrah which is accepted same as religion and there is no relation between two issues. The mention of nature along with the concept of religion comes to show the value of Islam is in accordance with human nature. Yet when the Qurʾān is interpreted in the correct manner, a better understanding of the human nature will be seen. The samples and types of i’rāb regarding the link between the terms of fiṭrah and dīn show that there is also a strong relation between religion and human nature. This shows that religion entails all the values and qualities that human nature contains. In the context of the Qurʾān, the term of fiṭrah consists of spiritual qualities, such as reflection, love, desire to find the truth, inclination to good deeds, avoiding bad deeds, creativity and worship rather than physiological qualities such as the desire to eat and drink, need of shelter and sexuality. These are core foundations of human nature which cannot be changed. However, these natural qualities can be lead the opposite direction. This is the reason why there is frequent mention of natures spiritual qualities in the Qurʾān. However, if the Qurʾān and the Sunnah are falsely interpreted, the core qualities of nature will be understood incorrectly which may not be a prototypical that the Qurʾān aims. The Qurʾān frequently makes mention and condemns those that do not use their logic, which comes to show the importance of nature. In order for the other nature qualities to be functional, first the logic must be functional. Likewise, since early ages people try to understand the objects in their environment and start to question them is again natures manifestation. The past and today's philosophical movements, scientific research and as a result the information and findings derived from them is a result of human nature. One of the main components of nature is the belief of the unity of God and acknowledging that the creator is Allah therefore comprehending that He is only worthy of worship. Thus, this belief provides the mental and emotional integrity of person. In times of difficulty, through the natural instinct people show towards the Creator is an act of the reaction shown which is coursed by natural creed properties. It should be said that another important natural human quality is love and affection. As the Qurʾān has expressed that human being is created from "alaq" also comes to the meaning of compassion. It is the human’s natural instinct to incline to those that he has compassion for. Once this inclination is made stronger the compassion turns into love. Desiring good or evil is also part of human nature as these two opponents are in men’s structure. Men being virtuous comes from choosing the good. Another important feature of human nature is desiring those that are aesthetically beautiful and disliking those that are aesthetically ugly. Men does not only desire those that are aesthetically beautiful but rather those that are spiritually attractive such as knowledge, modesty and bravery. It dislikes ignorance, lies and other bad qualities. Qurʾān’s phonetic structure can be counted as a proof to this. One of human’s natural instinct is to create and constantly update information. The word "khalq” is used commonly to bring anything to existence when it was absent totally, therefore this is used for mankind as a metaphor. As a result, it is possible to say that the most important human instinct qualities are reason, the ability of accepting of the unity of God, compassion, human and divine love, creativity, evoking good deeds, avoiding evil, valuing those that are ecstatically nice and avoiding those that are ugly. The different meanings and definitions of fiṭrah in tafsīr books and dictionaries such as dīn, pre-eternity of human destiny, initial agreement, and to geld animals are not the essential aspects of fiṭrah but the manifestations of the basic elements. (shrink)

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97) was a pan-Islamic thinker, political activist, and journalist, who sought to revive Islamic thought and liberate the Muslim world from Western influence. Many aspects of his life and his background remain unknown or controversial, including his birthplace, his religious affiliation, and the cause of his death. He was likely born in Asadabad, near present-day Hamadan, Iran. His better known history begins when he was 18, with a one-year stay in India that coincided with the Sepoy Mutiny (...) of 1857-59. In what would become a life of constant travel, he soon went to Mecca to perform Hajj, before returning to Afghanistan to join the service of the country's ruler, Dost Mohammad Khan (1793-1863). He later sided with Dost's son Mohammad Aʻzam, who ultimately lost in a power struggle with his British-supported brother Sher Ali. Al-Afghani's political activism eventually took him to Paris, London, Tehran, Saint Petersburg, and Constantinople. It was during his second stay in Egypt (1871-79) that he cemented his role as a reformer. He found in Cairo a class of young intellectuals who gathered around him, established newspapers, and used these papers to disseminate his ideas. Chief among al-Afghani's Egyptian disciples were scholar Muhammad ʻAbduh, journalist ʻAbd Allah al-Nadim, and nationalist politicians Mustafa Kamil and Saʻd Zaghlul. Al-Afghani's influence on both modernist and traditionalist Islamic thought continues to the present. An activist who sought to effect change through political journalism and public speaking, he did not write many books. This treatise, entitled al-Radd ʻalā al-dahrīyīn (Refutation of the materialists), was a rebuttal of the views of the pro-British Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who had argued that science is more important than religion in the rise of civilizations. First written in Persian following al-Afghani's exile from Egypt to India, it was translated into Arabic by his student Muhammad ʻAbduh, with the help of al-Afghani's assistant Arif Efendi. (shrink)

: ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simnānī (d. 736/1336) was a Kubrawī sheikh lived in Simnān one hundred years after Ibn al-Arabī (d. 638/1240). He authored around ninety works in Arabic and Persian on various fields within Sūfism, raised many disciples. His contribution to the sūfī tradition mainly come to forefront regarding problems like unity, latāif (subtle organs), rijāl al-ghaib (men of the unseen), wāqia (dream-like mystical experiences) and tajallī (manifestation). Simnānī’s understanding of the unity influenced subsequent sūfī’s and specifically Ahmad Sirhindī (d. (...) 1034/1624) and his sheikh Bāqībillah’s (d. 1012/1603) views of the unity overlap with Simnānī’s one. In Maktūbāt, Sirhindī who developed the idea of unity of the seen against the unity of the existence expresses that his understanding of being is the same with Simnānī’s one. Simnānī is also known as the first critic of Ibn al-Arabī’s conception of the unity among sūfī’s. Such that, whenever his name is mentioned the first thing comes to one’s mind has been his criticism against Ibn al-Arabī. However, his criticism against Ibn al-Arabī was not studied as a whole looking at his ouvre. Studying Simnānī’s works, it is seen that his criticism is concentrated on two main problems. First is Ibn al-Arabī’s employing the concept wujūd al-mutlaq (absolute being) for God. He maintains that it is not convenient to use this concept for al-Haq. His second criticism is against a sentence mentioned in al-Futūhāt: “سبحان من أظهر الأشياء وهو عينها”. In this article, causes for Simnānī’s critiques will be discussed and both sūfī’s conceptions of wujūd al-mutlaq and ‘ayn (quintessence) will be studied.Summary: One of the famous names in the Kubrawī tradition, ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simnānī is a sheikh who lived in the city of Simnān in the contemporary Iran between 659-736/1261-1336. In his youth, he served in the service of Arghūn Khan (r. 1284-1291) in the Īlkhānid Palace; and later, after a spiritual experience, he left the palace and turned to a Ṣūfī life. For a certain period, he continued worshipping and riyādhat (spiritual fight against the evil commanding self) on his own, and looked for a guide convenient to his character. Eventually, he became the disciple of the Kubrawī sheikh in Baghdad, Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Isfarāyīnī (d. 717/1317), and obtained ijāzah (permission) for irshād (guidance). After that, with the instruction of his sheikh, he went back to Simnān; and spent rest of his life with guiding his disciples and writing scholarly works. He authored around ninety works in Arabic and Persian on various fields within Sūfism. His contribution to the sūfī tradition mainly comes to forefront regarding problems like unity, latāif, rijāl al-ghaib, wāqia and tajallī; and influenced subsequent sūfī’s. Simnani’s influences can best be seen on the founder of the Mujaddidiyya branch of Naqshbandiyya, Ahmad Sirhindī (d. 1034/1624), and Sirhindī’s sheikh Bāqībillah (d. 1012/1603). In a letter Bāqībillah wrote to Sirhindī, he mentions certain differences between Simnānī’s understanding of unity and unity of the existence by stating that Simnānī’s path is not that of unity of the existence, and that his shuhūd (seen) is the most perfect shuhūd. Also in the Maktūbāt, Sirhindī expresses that his understanding of being is the same with that of Simnānī’s. Simnānī is also known as the first critic of Ibn al-Arabī’s conception of being and unity among sūfī’s. It would not be incorrect to say that he is more famous for this critique so much so that whenever his name is mentioned the first thing comes to one’s mind has been his criticism against Ibn al-Arabī. The main reason for this is that a letter Simnānī wrote to one of the followers of Ibn al-Arabī, ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (d. 736/1335) in which Simnānī criticizes Ibn al-Arabī’s conception of unity, was included in the famous work of Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 898/1492), Nafakhāt al-uns. This letter’s presence in the Nafakhāt played a vital role in its publicity. For this reason, it can be said that Nafakhāt made Simnānī famous. Yet, it should also be said that the fame stemming from Nafakhāt is incomplete and it is just about one aspect of Simnānī, a scholar who authored dozens of books on the Sūfism. Moreover, it is not correct to defend that Simnānī’s statements in that letter reflects a full picture of his opinion about Ibn al-Arabī. Hence, to have a better understanding of his criticism and thoughts about Ibn al-Arabī, one should explore other works of Simnānī as well. Studying Simnānī’s works, it is seen that his criticism is concentrated on two main problems. First is Ibn al-Arabī’s employing the concept wujūd al-mutlaq for God. His second criticism is against a sentence mentioned in al-Futūhāt: “سبحان من أظهر الأشياء وهو عينها”. To understand the first criticism, one needs to know the meaning both sūfī’s attribute to the concept of wujūd al-mutlaq; and for the second the meaning they attribute to the concept of ‘ayn. First, it should be known that Ibn al-Arabī did not think of being as a form category the members of which are beings. To the contrary, he uses wujūd exclusively for the Eternal, and refrains from using the concept of wujūd for the creation; and calls them mawjūd. In other words, Ibn al-Arabī differentiates between being and existence; and limits the concept of being only for the al-Haqq. Ibn al-Arabī states this view repeatedly in statements such as “al-Haqq (the Truth) is being; things, however, are attributes of being.” What Ibn al-Arabī means by wujūd al-mutlaq is al-Haqq who is wajib al-wujūd (the Necessary Being) and free from all restrictions. Thus, in a certain sense wujūd al-mutlaq means wajib al-wujūd. By writing that “Wujūd al-Haqq is the essence of wajib al-wujūd who is qualified with the perfect attributes of eternity and infinity. Absolute Being is the actions emanating from these attributes. Wujūd al-Muqayyad (the Limited Being) is the outcome that comes into existence as a result of these actions”, Simnānī explicitly states that for him Absolute Being is the actions of al-Haqq. What one can understand from the statements of both sūfī’s is that while by wujūd al-mutlaq Ibn al-Arabī refers to wajib al-wujūd (i.e. the essence of al-Haqq), for the same term Simnānī refers to actions of al-Haqq. Since in criticizing Ibn al-Arabī, Simnānī takes into account his own definition of the term Wujūd al-Mutlaq as the actions of al-Haqq, his criticisms are not valid. In fact, both exonerate al-Haqq from all the conditions. However, while Ibn al-Arabī chooses to verbalize the existence of God with the concept of “Absolute Being”, Simnānī only approves to express the existence of God with the concepts of wājib al-wujūd and al-Wujūd al-Haqq and differing from Ibn al-Arabī attributes the meaning of the actions of God to the concept of Absolute Being.Simnānī’s second critique against Ibn al-Arabī is related to this sentence: “سبحان من أظهر الأشياء وهو عينها”. An annotation that is written by Simnānī on a page which is out of his gloss on al-Futūhāt is highly harsh reads as follows: “O, followers of the most deviant leader! If you hear that one says that your sheikh is identical with his beard, put the claim that he is identical with his rejectomenta aside, should you accept this and tolerate him?” It is understood from these sentences that Simnānī considers the concept “al-ayn” as the essence of that thing. Though, the word “al-ayn” is one of the most multi-meaning word in the Arabic language and in Ibn al-Arabī’s works it is used with various meanings such as eye, the quintessence, spring, water source, tangible being of a thing, the essence of a thing and so on. The usage as “the essence of a thing” is very much common in Ibn al-Arabī’s works. It is interesting that while this word has so many meanings, Simnānī takes one meaning as base and blaspheme against Ibn al-Arabī. It is obvious that the main cause for Simnānī’s critique against Ibn al-Arabī in both problems is his attribution to the concepts different meanings than Ibn al-Arabī and then judging him in the context of his attributes. (shrink)

The hereafter, one of the main pillars of Islam, has been discussed by both theologians and Ṣūfīs from various angles and interpreted in many different ways. Although there is consensus on the main subjects, there are a lot of controversies in details. One of the Ṣūfīs who authored on diverse problems over the hereafter is ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla al-Simnānī (d. 736/1336). He was a Kubrawī shaykh during the Īlkhānid era. He inclined towards the Ṣūfī path after serving the Buddhist ruler Arghun (...) (r. 1284-1291) for ten years, thanks to a spiritual experience he had. He met with Nūr al-dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 717/1317), a Kubrawī shaykh based in Baghdad, and became a disciple of him, granted ijāza (a certificate of authority) from him. Upon his shaykh’s order, he turned back to his hometown and spent his life until his death, in his Ṣūfī lodge raising disciples and writing works. He had contributed greatly both to his own order and to the literature of Ṣūfism with his disciples and written works. As regards to the hereafter, his opinions on the reality of this world and its position against the next, death, the doomsday and its kinds, the existence of the paradise and the hell today and their present location are remarkable. In this article, his views over those problems are discussed in the context of his understanding of mystical training.Summary: ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla al-Simnānī (d. 736/1336) lived between the second half of the seventh century (h.) and the first half of the eighth century, in today’s Iran, during reign of the Īlkhānid’s. Thanks to the connection of his family to the Īlkhānid court, his father and uncle’s administrative positions at the court and his will and efforts, he started to serve Arghun (r. 1284-1291) around the age of fifteen and gained his personal intimacy. After serving him for ten years, he experienced a spiritual transformation and inclined towards a mystical life. He left Arghun for his hometown Simnān, on the pretext of his disease that courtier doctors could not treated, but under the condition that he would turn back after he recovered from the disease. He got better just after a while but did not return. He arrived Simnān at the beginning of a holy month of Ramadan, took off his formal clothes and began to mystical training himself based on Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī’s Qūt al-qulūb. After a while, he met with one of the disciples of Nūr al-dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 717/1317) and wondered about him. Then left Simnān for Baghdad with the intention of visiting him. However, Arghun was informed about this and prevented him from going to Baghdad, withholding him for some time. After a while, Simnānī escaped from Arghun and returned to Simnān and wrote a letter to al-Isfarāyīnī on this incident. In response, al-Isfarāyīnī said that he does not need to visit Baghdad, al-Isfarāyīnī would be with him spiritually and ordered him to start his training. Simnānī kept his connection alive with his shaykh during this period via letters and spiritual meetings but he could not meet with him face to face. Afterwards, he could meet him twice and granted ijāza from him.After that, upon his shaykh’s order, he turned back to Simnān and engaged with disciples’ mystical trainings and authoring books. He gained an eminent position in both his order and history of the Ṣūfism, upbringing too many disciples and writing around ninety works. His importance in the Kubraviyya rooted firstly in the fact that the extant sub-branches of the order have him in their silsila (spiritual genealogy). In this regard Simnānī is a key actor within his order. Besides, it is significant that he had great impact on the founders of two branches of the Kubraviyya, i.e. Sayyid ʿAlī Hamadānī (d. 786/1385) and Muhammad Nurbakhsh (d. 869/1464) that indicating his influence among the order itself. When examined from the angel of the history of the Ṣūfism, the most apparent and distinctive point regarding Simnānī is his criticism against Ibn ʿArabī (d. 637/1240) on the problem of being. Notwithstanding, his supreme contribution to the Ṣūfism is his doctrine of latāif, which particularly influenced Pārsā (d. 822/1240), a leading disciple of the founder of the Naqshbandiyya. Likewise his mystical experiences and thoughts on rijāl al-ghāib had also influenced subsequent Ṣūfīs. His thoughts on the problem of khawātir, which is crucial component of Kubravī path, and detailed information given in his books regarding the lights (anwār) and the truth of nūr as well as his explanations about the situations experienced during the manifestation of God can be listed among his contributions to the history of the Ṣūfism.Simnānī who wrote on various problems of Ṣūfism, dealt with the problem of the Hereafter in the context of his understanding of initiation. For the world cannot be disunited from the Hereafter, as his understanding of the Hereafter is examined, his view of the world is studied as well. With reference to the presupposition that there are three distinct dimensions of the world, Simnānī says that man’s relationship with the world should be differentiated according to following three aspects: the world’s being a plantation for the hereafter, the world’s being a place that should be abandoned and the world does not have a reality. According to him the hereafter is a continuous moment, whereas the worldly life is bound by the past and the future. Since the past and the future do not have a real being, hence the world as well does not have real being. Simnānī embraces the death and the Doomsday in an intertwined fashion in the context of his own understanding of mystical training. Approvingly the consensus of the Ṣūfis, he divides the death into two: necessary and voluntary. And he divides the Doomsday into three: big, middle and small. According to this, the wayfarer who has weakened his soul’s evil attributes via the voluntary death observes the situations of the small doomsday. Thereby the wayfarer who observed everything that is depicted in the Quran that will be experienced after the necessary death, gains time to take necessary precautions before the necessary death, which is irremediable. Another issue that Simnānī raises regarding the Doomsday is the sorts of the Doomsday. Based on the different names of the Doomsday, he says that there are different doomsdays each of which is related with one of the latāif situated among human faculties. Ultimately salvation from those doomsdays is possible with a different good deed. Another point that Simnānī comes up with is the problem of existence of the paradise and the hell today. He thinks that the paradise and the hell both exist today, with reference to his own kashf. He relates this narrating the verses and the traditions, which support his view. Besides, he accepts that there are two paradises and hells, one is inside the human nature and the other is out there. According to Simnānī, entering the outer paradise without observing one’s inner paradise is nonsense. This is possible only through a spiritual journey from one’s external being into his/her internal being. In the end, this can only be accomplished via the voluntary death. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Alexandra Kertz-Welzel’s “Two Souls, Alas, Reside within My Breast”: Reflections on German and American Music Education Regarding the Internationalization of Music EducationPhilosophy of Music Education Review, 21, no.1 (Spring 2013): 52–65Leonard TanAs a Singaporean who, like Kertz-Welzel, spent four years residing in the United States, I read the article with great interest. Born to traditional Chinese parents, I was raised steeped in Confucian values, savored Chinese operas, (...) and spoke Mandarin as a child. When I went to school in postcolonial Singapore, however, the medium of instruction was primarily English. I read Enid Blyton in primary school, Shakespeare in secondary school, and Chaucer in Junior College. My university studies in music were Western-centric. All seemed fine until my doctoral studies in the United States when I was inspired by my music education professor to revisit my cultural roots and to read Chinese philosophy. It was [End Page 113] no easy task reading the original texts—they were written on bamboo slips more than two thousand years ago in classical Chinese, and I needed tuition from my mother. Nevertheless, as I worked my way slowly but surely through each character, one thing became unmistakably clear: although I had read more Western than Asian philosophy, many ideas in the ancient Chinese texts resonate with the innermost recesses of my being and are unmistakably a part of who I am as a Chinese Singaporean, albeit one schooled in Western ways.Two souls, alas, have been residing within my breast! Like Kertz-Welzel, I had to find a way to reconcile my two scholarly identities. How may one negotiate the seeming chasm between the Chinese and Western philosophical worlds? In this paper, I sketch some insights gleaned from my journey into the world of comparative philosophy, specifically, classical Chinese philosophy and American pragmatism. In particular, I address two obstacles to the internationalization of music education identified by Kertz-Welzel, namely, the tendency for researchers to know only one scholarly tradition well, and the use of English as an international language. I then proffer Dewey’s metaphor of “friendship” as a way of charting a new “silk road”—one that blends Eastern and Western ideas—for the philosophy of music education.As noted by Kertz-Welzel, many researchers only know one scholarly tradition well. Dangers lurk when scholars have limited knowledge of foreign philosophical enterprises. To begin with, one may fall into the trap of stereotypical preconceptions. For example, I have been asked if it were methodologically sound to juxtapose Chinese philosophical aphorisms with the closely argued texts of the American pragmatists. The basis of this critique is understandable: think Confucius and aphoristic phrases that teach humans how to lead moral lives immediately spring to mind; think Dewey and one is reminded of the depth and breadth of his philosophical arguments. Chinese philosophical texts, however, are by no means mere aphorisms. While the Analects of Confucius may, prima facie, appear as if it were a random collection of brief sayings, many passages relate to one another and cohere as a philosophy. The rich commentarial tradition that spans over two thousand years further augment the range of insights embedded in the Analects. Post Confucius, Xunzi, the philosopher best known for his argument that human nature is evil and ought to be cultivated through ritual (li 禮) and music (yue 乐), articulated his philosophy through thirty-two books that rival Dewey in richness and complexity.1 For two souls to reside within one breast, one has to remain vigilant against potential stereotypes.The tendency to know only one scholarly tradition well may also inadvertently cause one to judge a foreign philosophical tradition using the standards of the familiar one. When encountering Confucius for the first time, scholars schooled in European philosophy may, as Hegel did, criticize him for being a [End Page 114] shallow moralizer obsessed with rituals (li 禮) rather than a speculative philosopher concerned with theoretical matters.2 Such a judgment is misguided as it ignores the fact that the Chinese philosophical tradition was founded on a set of metaphysical assumptions that differed from its Greek counterpart. Seeing the cosmos in discrete, quantitative, and unchanging terms, the ancient... (shrink)

The Shams al-dīn al-Samarqandī who is the first scholar to adopt the method of the philosophical theology in the Hanafī-Māturīdī tradition, is an important Turkish-Islamic thinker who has proven himself in rational and transmitted sciences by giving works in various fields such as theology, logic, mathematics, astronomy, tafsir, ādāb al-bahth wa al-munāzara. Placing the science of logic at the center of his system, al-Samarqandī analyzed every opinion and evidence put forward logically and aimed to reach the truth. Divine attributes, the (...) temporality of the universe, and the God-universe relationship are at the forefront of the subjects that he aims to reach certain and real knowledge. In this respect, al-Samarqandī analyzed the ontological character of divine and universal attributes. The concept of the hypothetical existential essence plays a key role for the author, who begins by analyzing the types of quiddity. defining the concept of existential as As “that which is without any negativity in its essence and truth", al-Samarqandī, who stipulates to exist as a block and not to have any negativity in its existence, brings a unique expansion to this concept. al-Samarqandī, who defines determination as "an adjective that distinguishes the existent from all mental and external beings", claims that this concept has an existential essence. As a result of his concerns about necesarry existence, Samarqandi, who does not deny the philosophers who accept the necessary existence and determination as identical, also overcomes the problems of multiplicity and causality that may arise about God, with the concept of "hypothetical", if he considers determination as "existential". As a matter of fact, al-Samarqandī divides existence into two parts as real and hypothetical, and defines the real existence as "existing in the real sense and not based on any rational assumption"; defines hypothetical existence as "based on rational assumption". In this case, it is not possible to talk about a real multiplicity or causality. al-Samarqandī claims that the concept of necessity falls within the scope of the hypothetical existential essence. Because wujûb means “the essence necessarily necessitates existence”. It is deduced that wujûb must also be existential, since something necessitating existence must take the judgment of existence. By characterizing the concept of wujûb with hypothetical essence, in the sense of a mental formation that is immune to objective existence, he also avoids the doubt of plurality. Concerned that the regard of possibility as an existential essence may require God to be necessary per se and the universe to be eternal, theologians accepted possibility as an absent essence. al-Samarqandī states that possibility can be accepted within the scope of true non-existent or hypothetical existential essence. As a matter of fact, evaluating the possibility in this way also eliminates the possibility that God is necessary and the universe is ancient. Attributes that can be attributed to God and can create a multiplicity in His essence or that can be attributed to the universe and cause the universe to be eternal are evaluated within the scope of the concept of the hypothetical existential essence, and, the idea that God is unique and that he is the only eternal entity is based on this concept. (shrink)

Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad, 1201-1274's Tajrīd al-ʻaqāʼid; selections; philosophy, Islamic; early works to 1800.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Heart of Islamic Philosophy: The Quest for Self-Knowledge in the Teachings of Afdal al-Din KashaniKiki Kennedy-DayThe Heart of Islamic Philosophy: The Quest for Self-Knowledge in the Teachings of Afdal al-Din Kashani. By William C. Chittick. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 360. Hardcover.Are you tired of feeling that the scientifically quantifiable world is not all there is, but that most books about philosophy are airy-fairy or (...) pie-in-the-sky? Then The Heart of Islamic Philosophy: The Quest for Self-Knowledge in the Teachings of Afdal al-Din Kashani by William C. Chittick has something to say to you. Chittick succinctly analyzes the limitations of scientism in his preview of the ends of Islamic philosophy (especially pp. 34-37). One could not make a better argument for exploring the Real beyond appearances than Chittick does.As we look around ourselves in the wreckage of the world-abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, "ghost" prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, tens of thousands of refugees at Darfur-we may feel that the world could use more philosophy. Since traveling in our current direction is leading to spiritual bankruptcy in our souls, perhaps a solid spiritual understanding of the universe would help?The author's stated goals are to introduce the major themes of Islamic philosophy and to introduce the Persian philosopher Afdal al-Din Kashani in English translation. The book consists of two parts: part 1 an overview of Islamic philosophy and part 2 the writings of Baba Afdal. In part 1 Chittick moves from the particular to the general, here from Afdal al-Din Muhammad ibn Hasan Kashani (d. A.H. 610 / A.D. 1213-1214) to the perspective of Islamic philosophy and the perspectives of philosophy in general. Chittick sketches al-Kashani's life, moving from his tomb in Maraq, Iran, to recalling highlights of the philosopher's life. When one considers the near-contemporaries of al-Kashani they are so illustrious as to make one's head spin: Ibn Rushd, Ibn al-'Arabi, and Nasir al-Din Tusi. More than any other details, these scholars place al-Kashani in the intellectual major leagues. Chittick also mentions that al-Kashani believes in philosophy as a praxis, a way of life to be implemented as well as an exercise of reasoning. He sees philosophy as training the soul with the knowledge of the mind.Chapter 2 forms an excellent introduction to Islamic philosophy for the curious reader. He begins by nailing some of the current problems in studying Islamic thought. He mentions everything from considering the dogmas of religion beneath [End Page 180] study to the refusal to accept what philosophers say at face value. Basically it is our own prejudices and views that prevent us from being able to understand their perspectives. The specific issues of Islamic philosophers that Chittick discusses are understanding God, the meaning of prophecy, and the "Origin and Return"-how the world came to be and our return to God after death.Chittick also provides a much-needed antidote to the tendency of many modern scholars to over-Hellenize Islamic philosophy, while at the same time, failing to refer to either the Qur'an or Islamic civil society. He locates the problem with modern thought in an inability to grasp any notion that refers to quality rather than quantity. (This can be seen even more vividly in recent attempts by American economists to give a dollar value to happiness on the success chart.) While quantification is necessary in analytic science, it stifles thought in symbolic, metaphorical, or religious discovery.In part 2, the Writings section actually begins with relevant background texts, including Aristotle, pseudo-Aristotle (The Treatise on the Apple), Hermes, and Ghazali (The Alchemy of Felicity). Then we move on to the Baba Afdal's own writings, including quatrains, essays, letters, and others. These writings show the range of Afdal al-Din Kashani's interests: moving from the practical (chapter 5) to the theoretical (chapter 6). Among the writings in chapter 5 we find his letter to Majd al-Din. It shows al-Kashani's clear-sighted understanding of human nature when he says... (shrink)

In the sacred texts, human beings are described as being created in the most beautiful way. In order to understand and define its integrity of existence in the most accurate way, it is necessary to know both its biological and spiritual aspects. In addition to the well-known and generally accepted characteristics of humans such as will and responsibility, there are also basic realities that constitute humans such as nafs, soul and mind. One of the most powerful factors that make a (...) person virtuous or worthless both in the presence of the Creator and in the eyes of people is the nafs. The nafs has many different meanings such as ”the essence of man, soul, person, self-being, mind, life, lust, desire, the source of bad habits".Philosophers, Sufis and theological scholars with different philosophical ideas in different periods in the history of thought have discussed and evaluated the subject of the nafs. Pythagoras considered the nafs as a substance separate from the body, Democritus as fire or heat, Plato as a substance that gives movement to the body. Aristotle, on the other hand, pointed out the difficulty of defining the soul and talked about three types of the nafs: vegetative, animal and human. The concept of nafs, on whose definition philosophers cannot agree, has a strategic importance as it is accepted as the point of separation of good and evil in religious literature. Because the human nafs, by its nature, has a structure that is prone to worldly pleasures, human desires, wishs and passions. Likewise, human beings are creatures of will, and thanks to this feature, they have the ability and freedom to establish positive and negative relationships and evaluate the beings and events around them. What should be the attitude of a person who has these characteristics towards pleasures, desires and passions? The main theme of our study is Mawardi's answer to this question and the solutions he identified. It was stated that having will makes humans different and superior to other living creatures. In this context, what is expected from a person is to use his will to control his nafs by displaying a sensitive, conscious and astute attitude towards the desires of his soul. It is observed in real life that failure to control one's nafs creates undesirable consequences both individually and socially. If the nafs cannot be controlled consciously, a person may become a victim of excessive passion for the world and the things in it. It is possible for humans to become arrogant and proud and to corrupt the environment, society and the world and make it uninhabitable as a result of pursuing their desires. Therefore, there is a need for a constantly dynamic and active consciousness regarding this feature of the nafs. There is no positive situation that an uncontrollable, undisciplined nafs that is a slave to its desires and passions will bring to its owner. The undisciplined and uncontrolled nafs causes individual, religious, moral and social traumas such as taqiyya, insincere words and actions, formal religious attitudes and behaviors, and alienating others for simple, primitive reasons. This is the point that the thinker focuses on and draws attention to. If a person can manage to control and discipline the passions and desires of his nafs by using his will, space will be opened for virtues that will bring happiness to individual and social life, such as brotherhood, solidarity, altruism. Mawardi evaluated this issue in the fifth chapter of his work Edebü'd-Dünyâ ved-Dîn. Mawardi, who thinks that education is an important factor in the reformation of the nafs, says that the mind and revealed knowledge given to man by God are indispensable elements of this struggle. Because he thinks that the alliance of reason, revelation and knowledge is necessary in distinguishing between right and wrong and in being patient with the harmful and evil tendencies of the nafs. A person who takes revelation, reason, knowledge and wisdom as a guide and whose emotions, thoughts and behaviors are shaped by this guide will not be defeated by his nafs. For this reason, Maverdi emphasizes especially when evaluating the subject of “Literary of the soul” that a person needs decency in adulthood as well as in childhood. In this context, he identified issues such as arrogance, pride, false envy and wrath, which he thought could hinder the evolution of virtue and virtue in individual and social life, and also showed the reasons for these and how to combat them. (shrink)

History works written in the style of chronicles are used not only for the purpose for which they were written. Chronic works may also contain reflections on the position of the ulema (ʿulamāʾ) at the time of its writing and his view of the scientific world of the period in which he lived. This work is based on the book ʿIqd al-jumān fī taʾrīkh ahl al-zamān written by the celebrated Ḥanafī jurist (faqīh) and muḥaddith Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī as a public (...) history book. This article, focuses on the state of ḥadīth science and scholars in the Mamlūks between the years 648-707 (1250-1307) and approaches of al-ʿAynī to these issues based on the work of ʿIqd al-jumān. For this purpose, the work has been examined in terms of certain keywords that allude to the history of ḥadīth through electronic sources. In addition, the work has been completely reviewed with the traditional method in terms of allusions and information about the hadith studies of the Mamlūks period. Eventually, the historical elements of ḥadīth referred to in ʿIqd al-jumān, scientific institutions, different groups of rāwī, different narration methods and classifications made during the period have been identified. In addition, the professional, sectarian and political trends of the muḥaddith of the period in question were focused on. Comparing the information in the sources written in the field of general history with the studies focusing directly on the historical elements of ḥadīth will contribute to compare the similarities and divergences. This study is an example of how to make use of the wafayāt sections in chronicle works. Examining a single book that was not written directly in the field of ḥadīth - even if it contains important information - is not enough to find elements about the history of ḥadīth and to make constructions regarding it. This necessitates the formation of a team that will examine a large number of books using the same criteria. (shrink)

During the Mamlūk period (648-923/1250-1517), some developments such as the support of the state dignitaries for scholarly activities, the interest of the ʿulamā to the Mamlūk geography and the establishment of many scientific institutions increased the interest in scholarly activities in society. In this period of intensive scholarly activities, women also started to increasingly take part in this field, and as a result, many female scholars were trained. The fact that women scholars were encountered among the teachers of the famous (...) scientists of the period is a clear proof of this situation. As a matter of fact, the teachers of Najm al-Dīn Ibn Fahd, one of the famous muḥaddiths and historians of the 9th (15th) century, set an obvious example for this. Sixty-seven of his four hundred ninety-seven teachers were women. Najm al-Dīn Ibn Fahd, a member of a prominent ʿulamā family of Mecca, traveled to different cities in the Mamlūk geography and took lessons from many teachers, men and women. What is more valuable for our subject is that he wrote a work called Mu’jam al-shuyūkh, which contains extremely important information about his teachers. This article tries to assess women's participation in scholarly activities and social positions in Mamlūk society, based on his female teachers. This work, made up of two parts, first deals with women’s opportunities to pursue academic studies and their subsequent contributions to science. The second part is about their position in social life which stemmed from the families they belonged to and from their marriages. In this article, in which sixty-seven female scholars of Najm al-Dīn Ibn Fahd are discussed, some important results have been reached. This look into his sixty-seven female teachers shows how widespread women’s relationships with scholarly circles were in Mamlūk society, and that especially girls of families with scholarly traditions were included in academic circles from a young age. These girls were able to get their initial education from close relatives and then they were able to connect to academic circles easily via family relationships, taking courses with many scholars including women. Women have been instrumental in the transfer of knowledge more so than its production. Their efforts both during their studies and as scholars were focused on ḥadīth transmission. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact reason why ḥadīth sciences were the focus, but one can say that the ubiquity of ḥadīth sessions and their ease of accessibility must have been a factor. It is seen that young girls who participated in these sessions were encouraged to study with older scholars, thereby acquiring a strong isnād chain and becoming a source of information in later years for the transmission of knowledge. However, it is hard to say that every woman who got some education took a role in knowledge transmission. One can even claim, based on Najm al-Dīn Ibn Fahd’s female teachers, that a lot of women in academic circles did not take a role in knowledge transmission as scholars, despite their potential. The fact that no official institutions are mentioned with regard to women’s acquisition and transfer of knowledge may be indicative of the importance of teacher-student relationships rather than institutions, or, it can be that women were more active outside of these official institutions. Also, the fact that most of Najm al-Dīn Ibn Fahd’s female teachers were all taught by several common teachers shows the liveliness of academic activity outside of official institutions. There is very little narration regarding the social lives of women who were engaged in scholarly activities. Among the most important reasons why this is so is the desire to put their scholarly competencies to the forefront. However, it is possible to get some information about their families and marriages for many of them. One can see that Najm al-Dīn Ibn Fahd’s female teachers generally married men who were also engaged in scholarship. The fact that women, especially those in the scholarly class, married from among their relatives must have been related to this. All of the married women except one have at least one child. While divorce is not too common, marrying again as a result of the death of a husband or as a result of divorce is not rare. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Truth Will Set You Free, or How a Troubled Philosophical Theory May Help to Understand How People Talk About Their AddictionPatricia A. Ross (bio)Keywordsveridicality of narrative, contingency of theories, belief-behavior, causal connectionConsider the following proposition: If one were to recognize the unsatisfactory implications of maintaining a certain theoretical position, one would thereby be motivated to accept a more adequate theory, which would alter one's beliefs and, in turn, (...) alter the behaviors that are based upon those beliefs. Faith in this proposition is what motivates many of us to teach. But, alas...Allison Mitchell's argument for rethinking addiction intervention—in particular, rethinking twelve-step programs—is premised on this proposition. According to her argument, addicts function with an impoverished sense of self that is reflective of a grossly simplified form of philosophical materialism. By recognizing the limitations of this philosophically unconvincing view, and by, in effect, accepting a better, more complete materialism, addicts can come to modify their self-conception. This modification is instrumental to recovery.A careful consideration of the chain of events being proposed, and the problems with it, is helpful for understanding the limitations of her argument. There are four points that I consider in turn: (1) considering narratives can tell us something about the self-conception of addicts, (2) philosophical materialism can help us to understand and explain something about an addict's self-conception and how it is inadequate, (3) this sense of self is distinct from nonusers and the way in which it is distinct helps to understand the problem of addiction, and (4) a change in self-conception with respect to materialism helps recovery and, thus, our best intervention is one based on having addicts accept a full materialist theory of the self and not a pretheoretic one. [End Page 227]With respect to the first point, it should be noted that Mitchell's overall argument does not depend on whether or not it is true that narratives of addiction tell us something veridical about the self-conception of addicts. Such narratives may simply provide us with a potential theory—a possible worlds scenario—of how addicts conceive of themselves. Mitchell points this out herself. The narratives and the interpretation that she provides of these narrative, "are meant only to highlight a certain pattern of self-expression and conception that may in fact be common in persons who use mind-altering substances; the readings do not establish any empirical matters of fact or philosophical truths, nor do they prove any conclusions about how such persons (must) express themselves or conceive their nature" (Mitchell 2006, 214).Thus, what the argument is actually concerned with are the theoretical claims about the self-conception of addicts that are garnered from these narratives. Nevertheless, because the narratives provide the starting point for Mitchell's argument, it is worth thinking carefully about the epistemic status of this body of literature. In particular, could a consideration of such literature lead us astray in our endeavors to understand how addicts might misconceive of themselves and, if so, in what way? What sort of epistemic status does this information hold?Mitchell is motivated by Wittgensteinian analyses of the relationship between thought and language. The particular idea that she employs from Wittgenstein is that every act of self-expression, whether it is verbal or written narrative, reveals something about the conceptual framework with which the author is working. Thus, one can learn about the author of a narrative—one can acquire a sense of how that individual conceives of him- or herself—by looking at the language that is employed to talk about and describe him- or herself.Mitchell enumerates some problems with this approach. She mentions that the author may fail to make his or her intended sense clear to readers; that the reader's narrative expectations determine the interpretation given to the narrative; that literary narrative may be less direct, less ordinary than everyday uses of language; and that interpreting such narrative via philosophical framework may ascribe to people positions that are more precise and sophisticated than they actually intend (p. 213).Aside from these quite serious problems, it is necessary to recognize... (shrink)

Patapievici is rather young as philosophers go, barely forty. He gained a wider audience in Romania by his philosophical column in the intellectual weekly quaintly called “22,” as well as by a couple of books written mostly in the mode of the “philosophical journal.” The present book triggered enormous and passionate controversy upon its publication, not least because it revealed fully and openly what had been sensed only by relatively few specialized readers until then: namely that Patapievici may be said (...) to be the leading original conservative thinker in his native country. (shrink)

Sayyid Sadr al-din Mohammad Dashtaki Shirazi is the inventor of the division of composition into unified composition and composition by join. With this division, Dashtaki has expressed a new theory about the composition of the material object from first matter and form, as well as the composition of man from soul and body, and considers these compositions as an alliance and unification, not simply the parts joining to each other. In this paper, we will present Dashtaki’s arguments on the theory (...) of unified composition. We will also examine three objections to this theory and responses to them. Finally, we will examine the background of this theory in Bahmanyar's phrases. Dashtaki believes that when the components in the compound have a real plurality, i.e. each one exists separately from the other, a composition by join is created, such as the composition of a house from numerous clays. But if the components in the compound are united and none of them are separate from the others and exists actually, the resulting composition will be an alliance and union. He believes that in the unified composition, every component is identical to any other component and is identical to the whole. Accordingly, Reza is a unique being, both human and writer. In order to achieve a composition, a plurality is needed and in order to form a single composition, there must be plural components related to each other. An important question is that, principally how is a composition possible, if unified composition comes to existence only when the components are made united with each other and with the whole? In other words, unified composition is not possible, because the first condition of the acquisition of the composition, i.e., the plurality of the constituent components, is not satisfied. Dashtaki strives to express a difference between the components in the union compound. He believes that the conditions of the realization and the survival of the components are different, and that is enough for them to be different. In Dashtaki's point of view, in the unified composition the components are analytical, not being separate and plural, in reality. In other words, the components do not have actual and "in-the-world" plurality, which means that it is our intellect that separates them and looks at them as independent objects. Therefore, unity and identity are in-the-world and plurality and discernibility are analytical and in the mind. Dashtaki's first argument for his theory in general is as follows: the three major material objects (solid, plant and animal) are undoubtedly real compounds. But in these compositions, components exist potentially, and in a unified composition, components do not exist actually. Therefore, these objects are unified compounds. The second argument is that the accuracy of predication implies unity. In the unified composition, the components are identical with the whole, and therefore, the components can be predicated to the composition. In Dashtaki's view, if A is predicated to B, then it could be concluded that they are identical and unified. The first objection to this theory is that the unity is incompatible with causality. From the perspective of the Peripatetics, form is the cause of the matter, and this is incompatible with the union of the two. Dashtaki states that in case of causality, there is no need for cause and effect to be two different and discernible entities, but a single entity may be from one aspect the cause and, from another, the effect. In other words, the foresaid causality is analytical causality. When mind analyses something, and then finds analytical components, it can see between those analytical and intellectual components, causality, and find some of them as the cause of the others. The second objection is the incorrectness of the unity in compounds with components not being similar. only in the compounds having similar parts, one can accept the unity of matter and form. For example, in compounds such as horses, it is not possible to accept the union of matter and form, because in horses, there are components with different natures, such as bones, flesh and nerves. Unity of These parts with each other and with the whole is not plausible. Dashtaki’s respond is that the horse is also a natural unit and has no actual plurality. Components having similar or different natures does not make any difference. According to the theory of unified composition, the horse's components are united with the horse's form and have only analytical plurality. Horse’s components are just analytical components, not actual, independent ones. The third objection is the incompatibility of the actual existence of components with their unity. But Dashtaki maintains that a unique actual personal entity cannot have actual plural components. He states that compounds such as horses exist objectively, but objective and real existing is divided into two kinds: dependent existence, and independent existence as a single real thing. Therefore, the two characteristics of "being a component" and "being independent" are incompatible and do not come together in a real being. Dashtaki has also quoted phrases from Bahmanyar to confirm his point of view. Bahmanyar says that the properties of an animal belong to the whole and compound, not to each component. For example, it is a horse that feels, not its bone or brain, as the eye is also a compound, but seeing is the work of the eye, not the work of any of its components. Therefore, the animal, which is something compound, has characteristics that none of its components have. So the animal is something over and above its components. Bahmanyar thinks the components in the animal are potential. Then he states a general rule: any compound in which unity is real, its components do potentially exist. Therefore, Bahmanyar considers the body parts of the living organism as a potential being and generally believes that the components of any compound that have true unity are potential. The potentiality of the components in a real compound does not that mean that the components are destroyed and a new thing is produced. The components are also available, but they do not have the effects they had separately before the composition comes into existence. In other words, the components have found a unique identity together and therefore have a new effect.. It seems that Bahmanyar has expressed the same idea that Dashtaki is looking for in the theory of unified composition. Therefore, it can be said that before Dashtaki, Bahmanyar has come up with the thought of a unity. Of course, Bahmanyar has not explained much about this, and Dashtaki is the first who has organized and completed this idea as a philosophical theory. (shrink)

May discovered Diderot's copiously annotated copy of this anti-materialist tract by Hemsterhuis, known to many contemporaries as "the Dutch Plato"; this edition contains May's interesting introduction, a facsimile of the original text, and a transcription of all of Diderot's comments. The comments bear on infelicities of style as well as of thought, though the latter preponderate: the Lettre is not, alas, the product of a first-rate philosophical intellect. Diderot's strong objections to Hemsterhuis' crude theory of a moral organ can be (...) taken as complementing his Refutation of Helvetius, which dates from the same period.—W. L. M. (shrink)

Farīd al-Dīn Abu al-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. al-Fahhād’s astronomical tradition as represented in the prolegomenon to his Alā’ī zīj (1172 AD) shows his experimental examination of the theories of his predecessors and testing the circumstances of the synodic phenomena as derived from the theories developed in the classical period of medieval Middle Eastern astronomy against his own observations. This work was highly influential in late Islamic astronomy and was translated into Greek in the 1290s. He evaluated al-Battānī’s Ṣābi’ zīj (d. 929 (...) AD) and al-Khāzinī’s Sanjarī zīj (fl. 1115 AD) with regard to the conjunction between Jupiter and Saturn in 1166 AD and found the errors of, respectively, about 35 and 10 days in the times predicted, which are verified by a recalculation on the basis of these works and modern theories. His inspection of the four solar theories established by his Islamic predecessors with respect to the quantitative differences between their predicted times for the occurrence of the vernal equinoxes is also correct. His calculation of the parameters of the solar and lunar eclipses in April 1176 has the errors of up to 1 h in the time and one digit in the magnitude. A general result of this study is that solely the evaluation of the synodic phenomena could mislead the judgment about the reliability and worthiness of the contemporary theories. (shrink)

In 1997 President Clinton apologized to the survivors of the U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study. Since then, two of his recommendations have received little attention. First, he emphasized the need to remember the shameful past so we can build a better future for racial'ethnic minority populations. Second, he directed the creation in partnership with higher education to prepare training materials that would instruct biomedical researchers on the application of ethical principles to research with racial/ethnic minority populations. This article proposes (...) the inclusion of these issues in the implementation of the Affordable Care Act. It asks, What is the right or good thing to do? What are our obligations to one another? Two challenges are examined: (a) Conducting research with African Americans without knowledge of bioethics specific to this population, and (b) the ethical dilemma of conducting research that does not adequately take into account the diversity within the Black population that is a contributing factor in health disparities. Training and policy recommendations responsive to President Clinton's Apology are presented. (shrink)

When the theological and moral structure of the prophets' speech about justice is understood, their sayings take on resonance with the actualities of our society.

Although Ghazzali in his Tahafut al- falasifeh has strongly criticised peripatetic philosophers but in both the two theories that he has offered about the resurrection of the body is under the influence of Ibn Sina’s science of soul. In his Tahafut al- falasifeh, he introduces the theory of a new body as a possibility for the resurrection of the body which is based on being, immateriality and immortality of soul as well as acceptance of soul as a standard for the (...) identity of character which are all peripatetic theories. His other theory is the theory of stimolation that for theologians has been a customary view and Ghazzali has introduced it in his al-Iqtisad fi-itiqad. Also in this theory we are witnessing points of difference between Ghazzali and theologians and the influence of Peripatetic philosophy on him. While for early Asharite theologians believing in stimulation, immaterial soul has no place, Ghazzali has offered the theory of stimulation in such a way that it has no contradiction with the immateriality of stimulation. On the other hand, although like most of the early theologians he considers life after death as a kind of accident but in the analysis of this accident he is not in agreement with them and like peripatetics he interprets these two as the relation and interruption of the soul and body. The influence of Peripatetic philosophy on him in the subject of punishment of grave is also evident. Reviewing the books and treatises such as Maarij al-Qods, al-Maznun behi ala ghir Ahlehi, Kimiyayi Saadat and Ihya Ulum Al-Din also reveals the influence of Peripatetic philosophy on him in the problem of resurrection from the topics of knowledge of self. (shrink)

Although the cause of Suhrawardī’s death may have been his esoteric views, we can see that this was a political medium. Because the decision of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī to execute Suhrawardī was political, especially because of the Crusades moving towards al-Quds at that time, where was taken by the Crusaders. There is a definite alliance upon that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī ordered to kill Suhrawardī. Because the other issues Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī was dealing with prevented him from coming to Aleppo and (...) examining this issue in detail. At the same time, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī could not have time to discuss whether the decision to kill Suhrawardī for political reasons was a hasty one. although the cause of Suhrawardī’s death may have been his esoteric views, we can see that this was a political medium. As a result, the decision of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī to execute Suhrawardī has based on political reasons. Some matters were mentioned in Suhrawardī’s death fatwā, especially his suggestion of disbelief to the people and his disorderly conduct of al-Malik al-Ẓāhir were cited as the cause of death. (shrink)

This volume contains the proceedings of the six symposia of the 'Philosophers into Europe' conference held under the joint auspices of the Royal Institute of ...

The most interesting feature about Mr. Richardson's criticism of my paper is that it reveals the typical attitude of the traditional intelligence tester which I set out to criticize. He accepts the view that intelligence deals mainly with the grasping of relationships, that intelligence thus defined is an innate ability, that it may be relatively isolated by the use of suitably designed tests and treated independently of other abilities.

Māturīdism is an Ottoman identity and this identity was not limited, as is commonly believed, to the last period of the Empire. It maintained its formal existence throughout the Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the context in which the Māturīdism was located or with which it was associated changed in the course of time. In the early period when the eclectic way of thinking was dominant, Māturīdism as a creed was apparent mainly in the jurists whose ascetic identity was prominent and partly (...) in the mystical currents that were essentially continuations of Yasawiyya. At this point, the Bukhara-centered Ḥanafī legal literature played a distinctive role. At the time of Meḥmed II and in the following period during which the philosophical kalām dominated the scene, the Māturīdism was relatively passive and was in search of a position against the Ash‘arism. The new Rāzian paradigm of thought that began to be felt strongly in the Ottoman lands with Meḥmed II as an attempt of integration into the global circulation of knowledge prevented to a certain extent the visibility of Māturīdism. However, even in this period, Māturīdism was remarkably reflected in the muqaddimāt-i arba‘a literature which was directly sponsored by Meḥmed II. The tradition of philosophical kalām in the Ottoman scholarship, just when it was about to yield significant results, was interrupted due to the struggle against the Ṣafawids. Transformation of this political tension, at the same time, into a fight against Shiism also brought about a constriction in the religious thought of the Ottomans. Shiism and its all other variants were bitterly attacked under the main heading of Rāfiḍa. Unfortunately such a refutational approach proved a boomerang and returned in time striking the Ottoman Ṣūfīs who stood near the line of the Ardabil Shrine before its Shiitization. Ḥanafī fatwā literature was used extensively in the refutation texts against Ṣafawids. This brought to the fore at first the Ḥanafite and then the Māturīdite identity. This paper attempts to analyze this changing emphasis on Māturīdism in the Ottoman period and the political and intellectual factors that supported and nourished it. -/- SUMMARY It can be argued that the debates around Ash‘arism and Māturīdism in the Ottoman period and the resulting meant more than attempts of the members of the two sides to understand each other and that Māturīdism, particularly from the 16th century onwards, was gradually brought fore as the identity of Ottomans. In fact, this identity was not limited, as is commonly believed, to the last period of the Empire; it maintained, in form, its existence throughout the Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the context in which the Māturīdism was located or with which it was associated changed in the course of time. In the early period when the eclectic way of thinking was dominant, Māturīdism as a creed was apparent mainly in the jurists whose ascetic identity was prominent and partly in the mystical currents that were essentially continuations of Yasawiyya. At this point, the Bukhara-centered Ḥanafī legal literature played a distinctive role. At the time of Meḥmed II and in the following period during which the philosophical kalām dominated the scene, the Māturīdism was relatively passive and was in search of a position against the Ash‘arism. In this period, Ottoman scholars still embraced the Māturīdī-Ḥanafī line in their theological views. Ḫiḍir Beg’s al-Qaṣīda al-Nūniyya, and al-Khayālī’s commentary upon it, and the commentary written by Aḥmad b. Oġuz Dānishmand al-Aḳshahrī on al-I‘timād of Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī were the most noticeable Māturīdite texts from that time. Besides, al-Khayālī’s supercommentary (ḥāshiya) upon the commentary of al-Taftāzānī written on al-‘Aqā’id of Najm al-Dīn ‘Umar al-Nasafī was also of central importance. However, the new Rāzian paradigm of thought that began to be felt strongly in the Ottoman lands with Meḥmed II as an attempt of integration into the global circulation of knowledge prevented to a certain extent the visibility of Māturīdism. But, this should not be taken to mean that Māturīdism lost its ground of existence. That the Ash‘arite works produced in this new paradigm were transferred to and fully integrated in the madrasa curriculum was not because they were Ash‘arite texts but because they were the most original and highest achievements of the philosophical theology. These texts that aimed at combining all fields of knowledge on a single platform, despite the Ash‘arism they included, constituted the peak of the Islamic thought of the time. In the preference of these texts, the fact that the Māturīdī tradition generally stood, in course of time, distant to the philosophy and chose to continue the kalām in the classical line also played a role. Māturīdī theologians Muḥammad b. Ashraf al-Samarqandī, partly, but Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a al-Maḥbūbī, to a greater extent, were notable exceptions to this general Māturīdī tendency. These figures were theologically Māturīdite, but their framework of producing discourse was the combination of philosophy and kalām as with their Ash‘arī counterparts. Therefore, Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a’s criticism of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and through him, of against the Ash‘arism in the context of muqaddimāt arba‘a was wholeheartedly supported by the Ottoman ulama. Even it was Meḥmed II who sponsored the debates regarding muqaddimāt arba‘a. The works written by such scholars as Muṣliḥ al-Dīn al-Kastallī, al-Ṣamṣūnī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-‘Arabī, Mollā ‘Arab al-Anṭākī, Khaṭībzāde, Sa‘dī Chalabī during his and his son Bāyazid II’s reigns were the supercommentaries written upon the related chapter of al-Talwīḥ, al-Taftāzānī’s commentary on Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a’s al-Tawḍīḥ where the former responded to the criticism of the latter from an Ash‘arī point of view. The Ottoman ulama, in their workswere forced to choose between the two scholars and they mostly supported Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a and Māturīdism. The tradition of philosophical kalām in the Ottoman scholarship, just when it was about to yield significant results, was interrupted due to the struggle against the Ṣafawids. Transformation of this political tension, at the same time, into a fight against Shiism also brought about a constriction in the religious thought of the Ottomans. The reflex of of identifying oneself through ‘the other’ made, to a certain extent, the theological and philosophical debates regarding faith meaningless, and gradually gave the Ottoman Sunnism a doctrinal and political tone. In such a context, the Ottomans’ paradigm of producing thought in line with the philosophical kalām began to lose its function, and, the focus of scholarhsip shifted; Shiism with its all variants were began to be bitterly attacked under the main heading of Rāfiḍa. When the refutation texts composed from the reign of Bāyazid II onward to criticize the Ṣafawids are chronologically analyzed, it is seen that the contents of the texts evolved from criticism of Rāfiḍa to criticism of Sūfism. Ḥanafī fatwā literature was used extensively in these refutations. So the fatwās issued against Rāfiḍa and Ṣūfīs in malāmatī line in earlier centuries in different contexts for different reasons were employed to criticize the new opponents. This caused two important results: First, such an approach proved a boomerang and returned in time striking the Ottoman Ṣūfīs who stood near the line of the Ardabil Shrine before its Shiitization. Ḫalwatīs, Bayrāmīs, Gulshanīs, Baktāshīs and Mawlawīs were the sufi groups influenced by this situation in varying degrees. Second, Sunnism was exposed to the narrowization and centered around the fiqh, particularly Ḥanafī fiqh, in the context of Ḳāḍīzādelīs who were the main adversaries of above mentioned groups. The culture of catechism (‘ilm-i ḥāl) that came to the fore through the efforts of Ḳāḍīzādelīs was a crystallization and was mainly fuelled from this tension. Such a crystallization led the Ṣūfīs, the opponents of Ḳāḍīzādelīs, to a higher level of discourse deemphasizing the Ḥanafī aspect: They underscored the discourse of Ahl al-Sunna and four madhhabs, and mostly turned towards the Shāfiʿī and Ash‘arī traditions to look for support fortheir views. This process during which the emphasis of sharī‘a and tradition began to come to the fore once again paved the way for the zuhd and fiqh-centered religious thought that was maintained from the time of the Seljukids in Anatolia and was influential until Meḥmed II’ reign. Therefore in the Ottomans, particularly starting with the reign of Suleymān I, an intensive emphasis on Abū Ḥanīfa was witnessed. Abū Ḥanīfa was at the very center of the debates revolving around zuhd and fiqh which came about in the same period and in which the sharī‘a sensitivity was a determining factor. Al-Māturīdī, whose name was overshadowed for a long time by the name of Abū Ḥanīfa, but who became prominent in the tradition with Abū al-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī, had to transfer his gains for a period of time to Abū Ḥanīfa. Emphasis on Abū Ḥanīfa looks like a rope that when pulled, all the tradition comes with it. When the topics began to be discussed in a manner that would also include the theological context, the contribution of the works ascribed to Abū Ḥanīfa, namely al-Fiqh al-Akbar, al-Waṣiyya and al-‘Ālim wa al-Muta‘allim to the discussions would be limited. For this reason, the need to refer to al-Māturīdī or to the theological formation bearing his name was inevitable. So, the literature on the points of disagreements between the Ash‘arism and the Māturīdism developed both vertically and horizontally in the 18th century and, corollary to that, the debates of free will as a corolloary to that, once again brought Māturīdism to the fore. (shrink)

There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts. There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.

The article is devoted to comparative analysis of metaphysical studying of a Samaritan theologian and exegete al-Ghazzāl ibn ’Abū Surūr (d. after 1755) and a representative of Shiraz Illuminationism school, philosopher, astronomer and mathematician Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr al-Dashtakī (d. 1541). Based on a scrupulous analysis of the doctrines by al-Ghazzāl and Ghiyāth al-Dīn, the author comes to the conclusion about their genetic link – supposedly, as a result of perception of Illuminationist systems in the Middle East in 17th–18th centuries. It (...) is noticed that a Samaritan exegete, acquainted with Arab-Mus­lim philosophic literature as a prominent specialist, taught about ontologistic primacy of light, metaphysical nothingness of dark, stated about light nature of action and com­plete dependence of matter on the will of the Creator. Separately it discusses the desire of both authors to deconstruct the classic for Arabic philosophy thesaurus. It is expressed in the convergence of the categories ‘movement’ (ḥaraka) and ‘action’ (fi‘l), as well as in the consistent replacement of the concept ‘self’ (ḏāt) with the concept of ‘light’ (nūr). The differences between the concepts of al-Ghazzāl and ad-Dashtakī are also discussed separately: while the first author inscribes the opposition ‘light – dark’ in a creation onto­logical context, the latter professes belief in the ‘total unity’ of the lights, their eternity and uncreation. The research is preceded by a short excursion into the history of Samari­tan theology of the 11th–18th centuries. Moreover, the article provides the description of unpublished documents which served the textological basis for the author’s work – in particular, the manuscript of al-Ghazzal’s interpretation of Genesis and Exodus ‘Dis­persion of the darkness [covering] the secrets of the Giver’ (Kashf / Kāshif al-Ghayāhib ‘alā Asrār al-Wāhib; British Library, Add MS 19657). (shrink)

This article covers the critical edition, translation and analysis of the epistle on creed, al- Muʿtamad min al-muʿtaqad, written by the famous Hanafī jurist ʿAlāʾ al-dīn Abū Bakr b. Masʿūd al-Kāsānī. In his work, which can be evaluated in the literature of creed, al-Kāsānī explains the basics of Hanafī-Māturīdī belief in a brief and concise manner without any discussion. This study consists of three main parts: examination, critical edition and translation. In the examination part of the study, the life of (...) the author is handled with various aspects, and at the same time information is given about the relation of the work to the author, its position in the literature, its method and content as well as its manuscripts. Then, based on the six manuscript copies of the work which are available in various manuscript libraries, the critical edition and the translation of the work is given. It is aimed that this work, which is discussed in Turkish for the first time in an academic article, will contribute to the studies on Hanafī-Māturīdī creed literature to some extent. (shrink)

al-Zarkashī, an ethnic Turk, is an important hadith, fiqh and commentary scholar who lived during the Mamlūks period. He was taught by some of the leading scholars of his era, such as Alā al-Dīn Mughultay (d. 762/1360), Imād al-Dīn Ibn Kashīr (d. 774/1372) ve Jamal al-Dīn al-Asnawī (d. 772/1370), and he grew up under their mentorship. Nevertheless, his only well-known student is Birmāvī (d. 831/1428). Almost half of his works have been related to fiqh and methodology of fiqh, and he (...) has also written some important works in the field of hadith. Among these, especially al-Tadhkira, al-Nukat alā Ibn al-Salāh, al-Nukat alā al-Umda fī al-Ahkām ve al-Icāba are worthy of mention. The work named al-Tadhkira, which we built our work upon, is the first known work to have been preserved in the field. Due to his being a first in his field, he was vastly studied as to how he evaluated the narrations and what kind of procedure he followed. In this work of his, not only the criticism but also the application of the text criticism adds to the importance of the work. Then, on the basis of this work, scholars such as al-Sakhāwī and al-Aclūnī made complementary works on the same subject. Summary: It is inevitable for a person to be shaped by the society he lives in. During the time when al-Zarkashī lived, Egypt was under the rule of the Mamlūks. The history of Mamlūks is examined under two periods: 1. Bahrī or Turkish Mamlūks (745 / 1344 - 794-1391) 2. Burjī or Circassian Mamlūks (784 / 1382 - 923 / 1517) period. Our author lives in both periods. About forty years of his life was in the period of Bahrī and the rest was in the period of Burjī. In both periods, the state did not have a full political authority in the country, but this was not the case in education and training. In fact, on the contrary to the political situation, scientific activities have accelerated by the arrival of many scholars to the land of Mamlūk because of the Mongol invasions coming from the east and the Crusades from the west. The increase of scientific activity was caused not only by the coming of the scholars but also by the support given by the Mamlūk sultans. In fact, they built many new madrasas in addition to the resurrection of the old ones. In addition to madrasas during the Mamlūks period, mosque, hāngāh, ribat and zāwiya are also among the educational places.Hadith, fiqh and Tafsir scholar al-Zarkashī is originally Turkish. He was born in Cairo at 745 under the conditions mentioned above. His family learned of gold and silverworking because of their subsequent settlement to Egypt, and they made their living with this craft. A person who performs this is called Zarkash in Arabic. Muhammad ibn Bahādır, who learned and did this job, was known as al-Zarkashī. al-Zarkashī, known for his love of science since childhood, was trained hadith by Alā al-Dīn Mughultay (d. 762/1360) and Imād al-Dīn Ibn Kashīr (d. 774/1372) in Damascus, and fiqh by al-Asnawī (d. 772/1370). Among his beneficiaries are distinguished personalities such as al-Subkī (d. 756/1355), al-Azraī (d. 783/1381) and al-Bulqīnī (d. 824/1421). The most remarkable of his student is al-Birmāvī (d. 831/1428).It is known that he wrote about fifty works in hadith, tafsir, fiqh, methodology of fiqh and other fields. Especially among these works al-Burhān fī ʻUlūm al-Qur’ān, al-Tadhkira, al-Ijāba, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fî Usūl al-Fiqh ve al-Mansūr fī al-Qawāid is worth mentioning. Studies on al-Burhān and al-Bahr were carried out at the level of Master and PhD.al-Zarkashī did not hesitate to criticize any person for whom he had found his mistake. For example, even though he has a great love for him, and even because of this love, he has been given the name of al-Minhāj, the criticism of al-Nawawī is the clearest indication of the value given to science. Not just him, critics of scholars such as al-Hākim al-Naysābūrī and Ibn ʻAbd al-Barr who are recognized as authority in hadith can also be considered in this framework.The work named al-Tadhkira which we have studied in our work is of importance in that it shows the accumulation of knowledge in the field of hadith. In order to compose this work, it is necessary to have enough information in this field since the riwāyas must be criticized in terms of isnād and text. To compose his work, al-Zarkashī has benefited from about a hundred and forty works related to hadith, tafsir, al-siyar, history, tabakāt, commentary, jarh - taʻdīl, ilal and maghāzī. The use of such works is an effort to reach all sources and right information as much as possible. Some of these sources are basic hadith books such as al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) al-Sahīh, Muslim (d. 261/875) al- Sahīh, Abū Dāʾūd (d. 275/889) al-Sunan, al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892) al-Sunan, al-Nasā’ī (d. 303/915) al-Sunan, Ibn Mādja (d. 273/887) al-Sunan, Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795) al-Muwatta, Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855) al-Musnad, al-Dārimī (d. 255/869) al-Sunan, ʻAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʻānī (d. 211/826-27) al-Musannaf, Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849) al-Musannaf, Ibn Rāhwayh (d. 238/853) al-Musnad, al- Bazzār (d. 292/905) al-Musnad, Abu Yaʻlā el-Mawsilī (d. 307/919) al-Musnad, Ibn Hibbān (d. 354/965) al-Sahīh, al-Tabarānī (d. 360/971) al-Muʻjam al-Awsat and al-Muʻjam al-Kabīr, al-Hākim al-Naysābūrī (d. 405/1014) al-Mustadrak.al-Zarkashī divided the riwāyas he had studied into eight subjects. These are judgments, wisdom, zuhd, medicine, virtue, prayer, story, words and riwāyas circulating in language. He shares the information he obtains from sources about him after mentioning the riwāyas he will examine. For example, it is mentioned that there is not a hadith which is transmitted as a hadith, it is a word of a sahāba, tābiun or a person. He transferred on the riwāyas the sources mentioned in the sources, but also stated that he did not participate in some information as the place came.The author has evaluated the narrators of the riwāyas from the point of jarh and taʻdīl. He did not only evaluate riwāyas in terms of isnād, but also text criticism. This activity is a distinctive feature of his work.al-Zarkashī gave information about the misrepresentation of the name of the narrators. He also explained the strange words that are difficult to understand in the text. It is a manifestation of his knowledge in the fiqh area that some of the riwāyas that are considered weak are expressed in some sects. The author described some errors about the riwāyas. For example, he stated that a riwāya that is said to be marfūʻ is a mavkūf. al-Zarkashī also included verses, hadiths and poems about the riwāya that he had studied while writing his work or he defended it by saying that it is not the case of a riwāya that is said to be fictitious.Perhaps it is the weakest point of al-Zarkashī’s work not to give any information about some riwāya, only to mention their isnāds. He also found some riwāyas that did not have a reliable isnāds and stated that their meanings are correct. This knowledge has become an enlightening characteristic for later generations.This work has a great significance in showing that the majority of the riwāyas that spread among the people are not hadiths. As a matter of fact, 73% of the riwāyas examined in the work are weak or irrelevant riwāyas. This work of al-Zarkashī is unique. The existence of such a work has not been determined before him. This work constituted the basis of the works written by scholars such as al-Sakhāwī and al-Aclūnī in the same subject after him. (shrink)